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Afghanistan case study

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NOTES FOR THE AFGHANISTAN CASE STUDY 

Monday November 30. 2009 - Lead by Director of Canada's World Shauna Sylvester

Afghanistan roundtable 10 am to noon; 1pm to 4pm.

-> Videos will not be permitted during this case study.

 

SECTION 1-

 

-How do we build a Canadian consensus on Afghanistan leading up to and folliwng 2011?

Agenda:

 

1. Introductions

2. Historical timeline

3. Canadian interests, values , assets in the region

 

Lunch-

4. Approaches going forward

5. Engaging Canadians - principles and vehicles

6. Recommendations

 

--> Please excuse typos.

 

HOPE CONCERN
premature leaving find a way to do in a positive manner
poorly explained to the public
help build stronger regional interrelationships between countries that we don't have strong relationships with
devleopment and aid structures are not going to be met that were intiially promised; remain undeveloped

take over for themselves w/ help from the international community

learn some good lessions

partisan poltics will get in the way; including our won and Afgani
exit as quickly as possible; no point of success
will not succeed; no conclusion we can be proud of
apply sufficient pressure to end 
as a country will not engage and consider the imperial and colonial represucssion and nation alliance in the region
in the next year and a half; put ourself in Afgani shoes who want to find a less lethal less destructive arrangement with their oponents and look for a negotiated settlement i.e. Ireland
2006 quote "we have all the watch. they have all the time" -structural and conceptual disconnect
all the progress that is going on is not negated

doesn't appear that any of the political parties want to make the facts public; educate an informed decision in advance of 2011 (road map)

133 ppl and 1 diplomat killed to date

stay invovled in some capactiy
canadian and Afghani casualities
devleoping a dialogue on human rights
perpetual sink hole

lack of dialogue; economically and soldiers are dying - no body is talking about it (long term plan)

problem of governance being solved in Afghanistan; corrupt

lack of traction for the devleopment effort; the money reaching the ground

having the wrong discussion in Canada i.e. military approach

look for disease not symptom; military to need
why is there no Afghani invovlement in the force task in Ottawa
Afghani women and children; achieve goals in the country
lack of understanding; don't know enough
Canadians keep Afghani need and wants in the forefront
human rights concerns; past and present
the Canadians can connect on a human level with people in Afghanistan
wondering what Afghani people are thinking
interact with the people there; grass roots democracy
 no merely reactionary
Canadians paying more attending to history and culture; learn the lessons of counter-insurgency; compromised diplomacy
don't want to see in ten years soldiers clothing etc. on display

Canada will take the experience over the past seven years and decide what we believe is truly important

Afghanistan as a step towards "Canadian foreign policy"

politics around our engagment; don't return to counter-insurgency of the past

focus on the causes
need more dialogue
comprehensive strategy in Afghanistan

Canada isn't talking within the government; semantics

general understanding

focus on development

situation where we can not need to participate in a place like Kandahar

in the end there will be some sort of result from our expenditure of blood and treasure

Canada will be realistic and decide where its values and efforts can be most profitably placed

leave Afghanistan within 2 years

dialogue will mature in Canada; public opinion

"graveyard of development"

has been excessive and continues to be and doesn't not see a good resolution

so much to still do in 2 years


 

SECTION 2- Timeline - Will be updated during the noon-1pm break.

 

Canadian Deaths in Afghanistan: (quick count)

 

2009- 27

2008- 31

2007- 30

2006 - 37

2005- 1

2004- 1

2003- 2

2002 - 4

 

Casualties in Afghanistan: (unofficial source)

 

 

Afghan troops killed  [1] 11,152   Afghan troops seriously injured  [2] 33,456
Afghan civilians killed  [3] 7,589   Afghan civilians seriously injured  [4] 13,660
U.S. troops killed  [5] 746   U.S. troops seriously injured  [6] 2,238
Other coalition troops killed  [7] 551   Other coalition troops seriously injured  [8]     1,653
Contractors killed  [9] 75   Contractors seriously injured  [10] 2,428
Journalists killed  [11] 6   Journalists seriously injured  [12] unknown
Total killed in Afghanistan: 20,119   Total injured in Afghanistan: 53,435

 

--> A will now stand for Afghanistan.

 

-people are currently writing on the timeline

-there are 22+ people engaging in the dialogue

 

-Pre-9/11:

 

-end of the Cold War; continuation of the threat they knew - now in Afghanistan?

-Afghanistan has become the "epi-centre of the war on terrorism"

-lightening rod for politics; regional problem / threat - more difficult to combat then the Cold War problem

-Cold War left a vacuum in international politics; the enemy was collapsing - competing interests needed to find a place to be significant i.e. human security

-need to give territory to these intangible sources; give physical presence - can't wage a war on terror - but can on Afghanistan

-"strategic crossroad" - "the only thing we learn in that we never learn" - no one has ever succceded in unifying Afghanistan (externall and internally)

-we (the 'West') have created the Taliban

-no evidence that the Taliban occupied any particular space

-sentiments: pre-9/11 - 2002 - confusion,

-Canadian soldiers there 6 weeks after U.S. President Bush declared War - was called "Operation Enduring Freedom"

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Questions Raised throughout the Case Study:

-why did a communist governemtn come to power ina conservative Muslim country?

-is A an artifical construct in the first place?

-we try to "territorialize" the 'other' through moral, intangible language

-liberal democracy, based on institutionalizing adverserialism, better than consensus-based organizing in the conflict of a grand Loya Jirga? - VP Vardk's idea

-A strategic ross roads N.S. / E.W. Outsiders have tried for years to have their way with this area? Alex the Great, 2 British Imperial armies, USSR. No one has ever succeeded. What has changed? Burden of history; "Graveyard of Empires"

-Is colonilaism only a physical presence, or is it instead creating the conditions to replicate our political-economic structures under the guise of doing the "right" thing

-What is Canada's grand strategy?

-moral middle power: is this a changed definition of imperialism

-what were teh Soviet objective in A?

1. promoting modernization

2. " " government centralization

3. " " secular education

4. " " women's rights

-"a failed state sometimes means successful tribalism" - in the eyes of tribals, the state promotes inequality, explotiation, oppression, the domination of outsiders.

-in 1898 the International Expeditionary Force (IEF)sached Beijing. NATO is the 21st C IEF

-1. finding progrssives from Taliban / warloads to bring infor gov't

2. playing hardball with Karzai re: corruption - contradicotry = Karzai is promoting thie

-is reconciliation with warloards not rewarding former fundmentalist regimes instead of advancing professionalism?

____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

  

 

SECTION 3-

 

-> These sections will be ongoing throughout the dialogue

 

VALUES

INTERESTS

ASSETS

complicated multiculturalism

development / reconstruction 

relationship with the USA

 

true freedom both personal and self-determination

canadian security

relations with U.S.

development and security 

Canada is not an empire, it is a colongy itslef a moral middle power or has the potential to be

belief in Canada as a benign actor int he world

regional security based on human rather than state security

relationship with the U.S.

 

economic power

lots of resoruces

human resoruces

 

equality, justice and compassion

 

operate as a supportive partner to the U.S.

reputation as "peace-keepers"

 

 multiculturalism and multilateralism (the heart is weak but beating still)

an end to war in the region

in assisting the government of Afghanistan to establish a secure economically sustainable human rights conscious society

diasporas - considerable Afghan-Canadian (Muslim) popualation

aid? punishment / reward

 

multilateralism pluarlist persepctive


human rights and evangelical PM who believes in inevitable holy war in the Middle East 

 

trade / econoimc incentives

poverty fo Canadian intelligence on A; knowledge, education, experts

multinational approaches to conflict in the world

human right, peace, very low value on Afgan lives

desire to please U.S.A.

 

WMD non-proliferation

nuclear containment India-Pakistan

gender equality

trade


more Afghan specific knowledge

classical strategists

experience in A

 

desire for peace

complicated multiculturalism

supposedly "controlling" the opium trade  

long history of international invovlement until 90s

quallity of life for Afgan people

 

$ NGO and private contractors i.e. SNC-Lavalin

understanding of feederalist governance in vast, geographically daunting territory

an electorate that has not studied history

fairness  

changing the dynamics in A that leed to the breeding and fostering of a terrorism threat globally

image / reputation - "brand"

 

belief in Canada as a force for good  

human rights dialogue as a tool

 

non-colonial past?
non-engagement in Iraq

NGOs

belief in canada as a benign actor in the world

 

Canada's interests- gain control over Al Qaeda and Taliban threats to carry out terrorist attacks in world including canada

good offices

relative to Afghans, we have dollars.

the road to rearmament run through Kabul and Kandahar reabilitate military and soldiers establishment revive that side of Canada's reputation in the eyes of its significant others

 eliminating a "hard" security threat (transnational terrorism)

assest- welath sufficient to support substitute effort

Canadian values

people to people links to A - civil society RAWA MAW etc.

 

providing assistance to those in need  

containing Iran

9/11 doesn't happen in Canada

sheen of the honest broker (if no longe rthe quality of one)

assests - $, people, time, spirit 

belief in ourselves as purveyors of "good governance" for the benefit of "others"

energy security through non-Russian pipe lines

over $300 million in humanitarian assistance (food aid, demining)

 

equality between women and men

human rights, dialogue as a tool

currently 2800 soldiers; 150 civilians

participation of women in electoral process

majority of Canadian's who see themselves as peacekeepers and global citizens

humanitarian responsibility

 

PRT

Rep of Canada Kandahar

security forces

WOG approach

prosperity

education available to all; women's rights

governance/rule of law; human rights / DD

supporting the UN Security  Council Mandate and contributing as a member of the international community

 

Canada as the "bridge" to:

USA and Latin America

Europe via history

Asia-Pacific via our future and demography

 

freedom of expression  

order and stability  

 

 

 

 

SECTION 4- Brainstorming approaches

 

 -scale back combat forces

-demobilize in terms of combat

-increase the emphasis put on the A army and police

-concerted effort to identify people that are respected by the Taliban in the country side; Mullahs (stronger / add effort)

-imperative to identify all of the real power players within the country and start thinking about what the future of A is going to look like in a year or two when most forces are pulling out

-likely a government that isn't ideal / the West would like; what is likely to emerge (anything less as unrealistic)

-force political players into action

-two countries need to be brought to the table: India and Pakistan

-need to tune up our diplomatic capacity engage regional powers; strategic opening- step up

-"bite the bullet time" - Canada's inability to influence the agenda; get every military personnel out in 2011 and spend the next 6 months really having Karzai on notice = corrupt warlords; dramatically cut-off funding and just to NGOs

-registration of the opium trade – legitimate morphine level

-rehabilitation – reconciliation effort                   

-consolidated effort to engage non-orthodox Taliban; working for them b/c need a job not b/c support the cause

-development and governance at all levels: hardball with Karzai, move to start developing democracy from bottom up district level

-empower the UN; give them the funding under their banner

-referendum in Canada; all political parties propose a stance and then vote

-capacity building; non-military uniforms based on Afghan values

-stay pass 2011 – expand literacy training for police  - focused on clear – education, security (preventative strategy)

-work with other donors to address Pakistan’s social development needs

-Pakistan has a decisive hand on A – if any one country could pull off some political solution it would be Pakistan –work intimately with Pakistan to achieve solution (India won’t like it, can’t do it). ISI  has agri-tribal areas

-we should apologize for taking sides in a war (civil war) only stay there if we can work for both sides – don’t impose our values at the point of a gun

-bring people like Malalai Joya to tell us how we should develop our policy on A – don’t take her discredit as serious; no comment

-based on logic that you can’t bomb someone then ask them to help

-lobby ISAF fundamental change in our approach to diplomacy

-away from counter insurgency and peace building approach

-Canadian military involved controlling Afghan borders / experts in arms and weapons – stopping this

-if we pull out we lose having a meaningful discussion with us on other global issues

-often the rhetoric around getting jobs done and steer back to end goals

-need to also work with China, Russia (as well as India / Iran) have a interest in terrorism

-NATO not the regional power – work Shanghai Cooperative Organ

-join Obama’s surge

-based on Afgan values

-focused on developing education

 

Themes:

 -engaging regional players - Pakistan and Shanghai

-development and capacity building - non-military

-development and capacity building - military (training of the army and police)and non-military

-negotiation and diplomacy

-status quo - go the course with where we are at / increase military and non-military process

-realist - recognition of the forces that exist if we want to get out of the area (withdrawal)

-engaging local leaders

-trust the Afghans

-governance - finding a partner we can deal with

-opium trade

-UN - blue helmet forces

-who, what, where, when - necessary resources

-advocates

-pros and cons

-questions

 

Feedback on Themes: chart to be uploaded.

 

SECTION 5- Principles of citizen engagement that should guide us.

 

-what principles should guide dialogue in Canada? Above all do no harm in political initiatives. Need for independent, principled for political not contingent upon US needs and pressures. Seek to broaden global participation in resolving basic issues.

-focus on enriching decision(s). Open with clarity on objective for dialogue. EDA's role in the worl in the context of A.

-long term vision strategy - Canadian and A interests - real policy development

-should be part of a greater discussion on vision for Canada in the world.

-have honest historic context

-what is our humanitarian responsibility? What are the human costs to leaving?

-independent communications of fact - no media / government spin

-a responsibility to properly describe the context that voerns our strategy and the geopolitical reality in A and the central Asian region to the Canadian silent majority

-truth / facts - stop telling stories, choices must be made available, open forums, explain what we want

-what would an Afghan first foreign policy look like?

-honest non-partisan discussion

-should be considering teh collateral damage / outrageouness of our actions; inclusive of Afghan people in and out of A

-open, structured, based on fact, forward looking, multi-level government, academics, citizens, means to collate, outgoing, focused towards a discussion

-are our strategic objects different than NATO's?

-honesty A

-meaningful exhanges / genuine dialogue not pre-scripted, open and transparent, inclusive, participatory, honest

-Afghans should have the right to sort out their form of governance without one or more groups imposing their vision by means of miltiary violence

-access to clear, accurate, information, ability to form own opinions

-clear incentive to participate ability to influence, national coverage to caputre regional views

-do away with cultural relativism in our dialogues and ask Afghans

-is liveral democracy and neoliberal growth the best way forward

-propaganda free

-accountability

-candor without attacks

-we need to explain to Canadians that the global climate has changed. We cannot revert to cold war solutions (i.e. peacekeeping) to post-Cold War problems (i.e. A). Canada needs a new role and now is teh time to define it.

-recognize that A cultures are almost opposite to ours

-try to see their world from their perspective

-try to see merits int heir culture and respect it

-what are our strategic objectives? do our tractics suppor them?

-mechanisms for seeking nonaligned noncorporate noninstitutionalized non-NGO Canadian citizens

-government funding for democratic gross roots education rpgorammes to disseminate a range of writers regarding A issues

-acknowledgement of our Canadian tendency to see the "other" through ethnocentric lenses

-transparency

-greater cultural awareness, understand the context (history, values, norms, beliefs, collective vs. individualistic)

-independent CMN bureau

-information / education about A; education and being well informed

-what does self-determination for Afghans look like? How do we help them do this?

 

--> CHECK OUT: Waging Peace Film - wagingpeacefilm.com - feedback is welcome: brooks@3world.ca

 

Recommendations to the PM:

 

What is one recommendation you would make to Prime Minister Harper with respect to Canada's enagement in Afghanistan? Participants were asked to provide their ideas in writing by email. 

 

1. Do not stifle debate or control the message on Afghanistan. When you stifle debate, you make this war about your own personal ideology, rather than the position of Canada as a whole; this is dangerous.

 

2. De-militarize, and depoliticize Canada; international policy instruments and approaches; rebalance and give diplomacy a chance by re-investing in the frontier.

 

3. Invest in foreign policy development; knowledge, discussion, people on the ground.

 

4. Trust Canadians.

 

This requires some elaboration. If given all the appropriate information, Canadians would make the best and most ethical choice. But the key is 1) how to get the information to them fairly and completely; and 2) how to measure their position accurately.

 

Regarding 1), it is necessary to give both sides - the pro-mission and anti-Canadian mission perspectives. The government can handle the "pro" side, but the "anti" side must be given to non-government representatives to articulate. This cannot be a biased panel like the Manley Commission - the "anti" side must be represented by strong and credible opponents to the war, and they must be able to present their views without any government editing or censorship. Also we cannot rely on the media to get the message to the Canadian public, because they are not competent or unbiased. 

Regarding 2) we cannot let our Members of Parliament represent "Canadian opinion", because they are partisan and Canadian democracy is too weak to gauge real Canadian opininon through the current party and election process.

 

What I would propose is the following:

 

Two mass mailouts to all Canadians of a debate:

 

First, each side presents its major arguements for the "Pros & Cons"

 

Second, there is a rebuttal from each side of the others arguments

 

Then a referendum is held seeking the final position of the Canadian public, and the government is obliged to act accordingly.

 

I know this is onerous and costly, but war is even moreso. I think it is worth the effort, and since I trust Canadians to do the right thing (but not our government), the result would probably be a good one, and Canada can begin to win back some of the international respect we have lost in recent years.

 

 

5. Keep all elements of Canadian power engaged in Afghanistan until such time as Afghan resources can replace them.

 

Canada has a long history, coming up on a century now, of intervention and assistance.  In earlier days this was done under the auspices of being a colony of the British, but since the commencement of the Second World War (in the military realm as a minimum), Canadian governments have decided where and when to use our military power.  As our foreign policy came into its own, with the development of agencies like DFAIT and CIDA, we deployed more and more Canadian resources, beyond the military, to assist where we felt that it was important. 

 

Succinctly put, there is no more important task or use for the resources we can allocate to Afghanistan.  Their judiciary and corrections service is not functioning to any credible standard; their literacy rate would prevent most Afghans from ever reading this document; their infant mortality rate and rate of death for women giving birth is incredibly high; they lack a police force in anything but name and uniform; economically they are among the poorest, if not the poorest, of any people on the planet; they lack a functioning health care system; their educational system is in tatters and prevents the development of human capacity to advance against the myriad issues they face; their agricultural system cannot feed their populace; they lack heavy industry of any description; their life expectancy is low enough that over half their population is under 15.  They need assistance and Canada has a tradition of giving it, so why would we leave. 

 

Some would argue that the complexity of the situation is too great, and that the task is too difficult.  I respond by saying that while it is true that there are no easy or elegant solutions, this should not prevent us from trying.  The level of difficulty is not disputed, but Canada needs to do something difficult if for no other reason than to be the global leader that it frequently claims to aspire to be.  

 

Others would argue that our continued involvement is nothing more than the exercise of a post-colonial form of imperialism.  Perhaps this is true, however, perhaps this modern form is one we can shape to be benevolent, without search for profit, power or exploitation.  The need to modernise, and give meaning to the concepts of R2P, human rights, rule of law, and the export of the values that we hold dear should not be forsaken simply because we will need to confront a culture of tribalism, misogyny, and abuse of those segments of society that cannot stand up for themselves.  If we believe in ourselves as a nation, we cannot walk away when others are suffering under the guise of tradition and convention. 

 

A last argument will be that enough blood has been spilled, that we should stop now, and withdraw the military and civilian elements we have deployed which have themselves become  a nexus for the divergent insurgent forces to focus on.  If the choice is then between deploying less, in an effort to avoid the confrontation and subsequently to achieve less over time, or to deploy more, have the confrontation that must come, and perhaps achieve more, then I will opt for the second course.

 

I do not debate whether we should change our means and the methodology being employed; there is much merit in having this discussion.  But, I do argue against those elements that would see us adopt an isolationist stance; I do argue against those who would see us deploy a half-hearted effort with questionable ability to achieve; and I do argue against those who would see us withdrawal because of anyone of the excuses listed above. 

 

Canada needs to be in Afghanistan, as much as Afghanistan wants and needs Canada there.  I therefore urge that you work to keep all elements of Canadian national power engaged in Afghanistan until a legitimate government from that country says that our efforts are no longer required.

 

6.) Adopt an Afghan-First approach to your Afghan Foreign Policy - first order of business is to pressure President Obama to end his air strikes with their associated killings of innocent civilians.

 

Scholars, thinkers, and doers, of Foreign Policy have argued in many different ways that foreign policy by construction cannot go beyond the desire to advance a national self-interest agenda.  In order to keep the terms of debate favourable to this thesis, folks have constructed a polarity that pitts altruism at the other end of the debate.   An Afghan first foreign policy would put the needs of Afghan people (not necesarily the Afghan government) at the forefront of your thinking and strategy going forward.   It will require you and your ministers to think far outside the structural limitations of western liberal democracy and tired, failed, attempts at stability and development led by neoliberal strategies.   

 

Here's a start:

 

A.)  Work with your NATO counterparts to prevent the continuation of air-strikes.   These kill indiscriminately and inaccurately.   They radicalize the local population against you.   India has fought counter-insurgency wars for 6 decades without using planes.  How did they do this?   With tremendous casualties that the Indian population have been willing to absorb to acheive their strategic objectives.  If you aren't willing to fight counter-insurgency (which means much higher casualties on NATO's side) then stop fighting, because you are only making life more and more unbearable for Afghan civlians who ought to be at the center of our efforts.

 

B.) Reclaim a position of admiration in the international community by punching above your weight in diplomacy.  Focus your attention on providing space and facilitation for New Delhi and Islamabad to have regular talks about security.   Maybe they will tell you to get lost.  Be curtious, respectful, and genuine.  A stable and secure Pakistan is a point of policy today for India, but policy means nothing next to history, nationalism, and fear.  Don't pretend to be an honest, objective, broker - we want India and Pakistan to trust each other because we cannot even begin to calculate the positive possibilities for regional security if they were to work together.

 

C.)  Hire Afghan civilians and NGO  workers from across the country to be advisors and participants in the future direction of Canadian policy in Afghanistan.  It is their country, where we are spending our money and lives.   We DO  NOT want to see any of these resources wasted in the black-hole of ignorance and narrowly defined, short-term self interest.  (The Cold War has wasted more than enough time, money, lives, and dreams in these endeavors  )

 

D.) Work with your colleagues and enemies in Parliament towards this effect.  We understand the limitations of our democracy...it will be very difficult for any opposition party to argue that we should not adopt a policy that would decrease the amount of Afghan civilians killed in the interest of buying increasingly expensive death toys and bombs.  While it is of the utmost importance to yourself, Mr. Layton, and Mr. Ignatieff who leads this country, it is of no signficance to me and many other Canadians who care deeply about foreign policy.  I  do not believe that any major political party would be acting substantively different from how your government is acting right now - illusions to the contrary are little more than partisan nonsense that is offensive to Canada's collective intelligence.  

 

7. Most foreign policy scholars agree that only narrow national-self interest can be the basis of Foreign Policy.  I challenge you to conceive of Foreign Policy towards Afghanistan that would put the needs and will of the Afghan people (not government) ahead of the strategic self interest of Canada.  History will ultimately leave 20th century geopolitics in the dust.

 

8. We need a significant catalyst to get the discussion\debate going. Reconstitute the Manley Commission as they already know the turf and could quickly get up to speed. They are credible to the Canadian public and to the two major parties. Give them 3 or 4 months to engage Canadians and produce a report for Parliament. This would surely foster discussion. Such a major national decision cannot be taken without an informed debate/dialogue/discussion occurring.

 

 

9. Extend troop presence past 2011 while focusing resources on a mass overhaul of Ministry of Education through restructuring, capacity development, technical assistance and improving accountability in education outcomes.



 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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